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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
RYAN ANTHONY RASULO,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45311
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-7438

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Anthony Rasulo pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, drug trafficking (heroin), and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted
felon. Although the defense asked for the mandatory minimum sentence (ten years fixed, with no
indeterminate time), the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with ten
years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Rasulo asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion by
imposing sentences that are excessive in light of all the mitigating evidence in his case.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
While Mr. Rasulo was away from the home in which he and his girlfriend rented a room,
the owner of the house, Joni Sheets, discovered evidence of drug use in Mr. Rasulo’s room. (PSI,
pp.3, 44, 48-50.) Ms. Sheets’ boyfriend, Travis Kitchen, prepared to confront Mr. Rasulo about
his drug use by placing a metal baseball bat in the living room. 1 (PSI, pp.49-50, 115) When
Mr. Rasulo pulled up to the home, Mr. Kitchen went outside and confronted him. (PSI, pp.3, 4849.) Upon being confronted by Mr. Kitchen, Mr. Rasulo ran into the home; Mr. Kitchen followed
him inside, where the two men continued arguing. (PSI, pp.48-49.) At one point, when
Mr. Kitchen tried to physically block Mr. Rasulo from leaving the residence, Mr. Rasulo pulled a
gun from his waistband and demanded that Mr. Kitchen back up. (PSI, p.49.) Mr. Rasulo later
explained that he did this because he was frightened due to Mr. Kitchen’s size and the baseball
bat.2 (PSI, p.50.) Unfortunately though, while Mr. Rasulo had the gun drawn, Ms. Sheets’
children and, moments later, Ms. Sheets herself, entered the home. (PSI, pp.48-49.) Mr. Rasulo
waived the gun around, ordering everyone to back away from him. (PSI, pp.48-50.) Despite the
presence of the gun, Mr. Kitchen refused to allow Mr. Rasulo to re-enter his bedroom to dispose
of his drugs; however, he eventually did let Mr. Rasulo leave the house. (PSI, pp.48-50.) Once
outside, Mr. Rasulo put the gun back in his waistband, paused once or twice to plead with
Ms. Sheets to flush his drugs, and then left with his girlfriend and her son. (PSI, pp.49-50.)

1

Although the prosecutor sought to portray the presence of a baseball bat as a coincidence (see
Tr., p.35, Ls.5-11), that was not the case. Mr. Kitchen admitted to the police that he brought the
bat to his confrontation of Mr. Rasulo. (PSI, pp.49, 115.)
2
Although it is not disputable that Mr. Kitchen brought the bat to his confrontation with
Mr. Rasulo, the record is not clear as to the extent to which Mr. Kitchen expressly or impliedly
threatened Mr. Rasulo with that bat. However, since Mr. Rasulo was aware of the bat and said he
only pulled a gun because he was afraid of what Mr. Kitchen might do with that bat, it is
reasonable to infer that some type of threat—whether express or implied—was made by
Mr. Kitchen.
2

The police arrived shortly after Mr. Rasulo left. (PSI p.48.) While the police were there,
Mr. Rasulo called and spoke with Mr. Kitchen (unaware that the police were listening in),
apologizing for his actions, and explaining that he only pulled the gun on Mr. Kitchen because he
was afraid—based on the presence of the baseball bat and his diminutive size—that Mr. Kitchen
was going to hurt him. (PSI, pp.49-50.) A search warrant was obtained, and the police searched
the room in which Mr. Rasulo and his girlfriend had been staying. (PSI, pp.62, 67.) They found
used and uncapped syringes, heroin, a shotgun, a digital scale, marijuana, and an array of pills.
(PSI, pp.63-64, 67-68.)
The next day, Mr. Rasulo was arrested. (PSI, pp.441-55.) He was ultimately charged with
nine felonies, a deadly weapons enhancement, and five misdemeanors. (R, p.77-78.) Ultimately,
Mr. Rasulo entered into a plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, drug trafficking (heroin), and unlawfully possessing a weapon as a felon. (PSI,
p.27-30, Tr., p.24, Ls.6-18, p.25, Ls.4-14, p.26, Ls.4-12.) The other counts were dismissed.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.19-25, Tr., p.18, Ls.1-25, Tr., p.19, Ls.1-4.)
At sentencing, the State recommended an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years, with
fifteen years fixed. (Tr., p.33, Ls.6-9.) Defense counsel asked instead for a sentence of ten years,
all fixed, for the drug charge (which represented the mandatory minimum sentence), a concurrent
two-year fixed sentence for the aggravated assault charge, and a concurrent two-year fixed
sentence for the possession of a firearm charge, so that Mr. Rasulo could get into the IDOC
programing that he so desperately needs. (Tr., p.42, Ls.22-25, p.43, Ls.4-15.) The district court
instead imposed a sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed, for trafficking, and five years
fixed for both aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a firearm charges. (Tr., p.51, Ls.1725.)
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Mr. Rasulo appealed timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (See
R., pp.180-81.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty
years, with ten years fixed, which is excessive given reasonable view of the evidence.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of Twenty
Years, With Ten Years Fixed.
The district court did not adequately consider the mitigating evidence in sentencing
Mr. Rasulo and thus, Mr. Rasulo’s sentence is excessive and does not further the objectives of
criminal punishment.
Mr. Rasulo asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of twenty years,
with ten years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Rasulo does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Rasulo must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing
criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
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individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
A sentencing court must consider all mitigating evidence, which includes the defendant’s
addiction, troubled childhood, and mental illness. See, e.g., State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
n.5 (1981) (holding that substance abuse “is a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment
upon sentencing”); State v. Williams 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Williams’
troubled childhood was a mitigating “factor that bears consideration at sentencing”); State v.
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1995) (noting that the Idaho Code requires that the trial court
consider the defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor). The district court erred when it
did not sufficiently consider Mr. Rasulo’s drug addiction, sexual abuse as a child, and his mental
illness as mitigating factors during sentencing.
Mr. Rasulo has been using drugs and drinking alcohol since he was twelve. (PSI, pp.16566, 170, 242.) By age seventeen, Mr. Rasulo had tried many different drugs which led to trouble
at school, at home, and legally. (See PSI, pp.162-66.) During this time, his parents sent him to
SUWS Wilderness Program, which was fairly successful, as he then abstained from using drugs
until he was nineteen. (PSI, pp.166, 170.) Since age nineteen though, Mr. Rasulo has battled (and
lost to) addiction on numerous occasions. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.6-7, 12.) Since turning eighteen,
virtually all of Mr. Rasulo’s crimes have been in some way related to drugs. (See PSI, pp.2, 5-6,
163.)
In addition to addiction, Mr. Rasulo has faced psychological challenges. He started
counseling at a young age due to sexual abuse committed by a male babysitter. (PSI, pp.9, 165,
236.) Beginning in the first grade Mr. Rasulo was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and given Ritalin. (PSI, pp.12, 165.) By age fourteen,
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Mr. Rasulo was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder. (PSI, p.165.) In the next four years,
Mr. Rasulo was diagnosed with Anxiety and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. (PSI, pp.12, 18,
163, 165, 195-96, 199-201.) Mr. Rasulo’s mental health disorders were treated with an array of
medication as well as psychiatric treatment, and individual and group cognitive therapy. (PSI,
pp.163, 165, 199, 201, 204, 273-77, 284-93.) His mental health has caused him problems, not
only with his addiction, but also in relationships with his family. (PSI, pp.163, 166, 203, 206,
652-54.) Since turning eighteen, Mr. Rasulo has been hospitalized due to suicidal thoughts on
three different occasions. (PSI, pp.166, 212, 246, 292-94, 296-301.) He has continued to struggle
with mental illness, which at times has gone untreated. (PSI, pp.236, 246, 292-94.) When treated,
Mr. Rasulo’s mood stabilizes, his motivation for treatment increases, he is cooperative, and he
wholly appears to be a different person. (PSI, pp.195, 292, 299-300.)
Mr. Rasulo feels that his addiction began in high school after an injury. (Tr., p.39, Ls.1719.) That may be. Or it could be the case that his drug use began as a way to self-medicate his
serious mental health problems or cope with his childhood victimization. There is also a family
history of addiction, including Mr. Rasulo’s uncle who lost his battle to addiction (PSI, p.653),
which may explain why Mr. Rasulo’s early drug use quickly escalated to addiction. No matter
how his addiction started though, or why it has been so hard to control, the fact is that
Mr. Rasulo has spent a lifetime fighting both his mental health problems and a fierce drug
addiction.
Addiction, childhood sexual trauma, and mental illness are all factors that the court was
required to consider as mitigating evidence when sentencing Mr. Rasulo to prison. See Osborn,
102 Idaho at 414 n.5; Williams 135 Idaho at 620; and Odiaga, 125 Idaho at 391. The district
court erred when it did not adequately consider all of this mitigating evidence and impose a more
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lenient sentence, and it therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Rasulo to twenty
years in prison, with ten years fixed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rasulo respectfully requests that this Court reduce his aggregate sentence to ten years
all fixed, or as the Court deems necessary and just. Alternatively, he requests that his case be
remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2018.

_________/s/________________
JESSALYN HOPKIN
Intern

________/s/_________________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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